Here’s a comprehensive take on Mercedes from Jane McAlevey–someone with way more organizing chops than I’ll ever have.
For my part, I woke up on May 17 thinking, “Brace yourself, they’re probably going to lose.” In my experience, the “Baby, just give me one more chance…” angle is highly effective. Mercedes implemented substantial improvements in the wage structure while still retaining a somewhat reduced version of the “Alabama discount”. Then they fired the plant manager and the new guy asked for some time to set things right. They intimated that, if people were still discontented, they could come back in a year and vote the union in. Of course, Mercedes will spend the next year systematically undermining union support, harassing union leaders, etc. (though they may be somewhat constrained by German and U.S. labor investigations).
When a company first pulled this on me–way back in the 1980s–I thought that it was ridiculous and that the workers would see through it. But it seems to work almost every time. We tried inoculating workers in advance by predicting that this is one of the things the company might do but it had limited effect. In a couple of places, we were able to come back a year later and win a campaign based on broken company promises. But in most cases, union support disintegrated after the losing election.
Unlike Volkswagen, whose Chattanooga plant voted overwhelming for the UAW in April, it looks like Mercedes ran a very aggressive anti-union campaign supported by the political and religious establishment, not to mention the beloved (by some) ‘Bama football icon Nick Saban, who just happens to co-own a couple of Mercedes dealerships. Again, no surprise to anyone organizing in the south. They even engaged in a bit of good old-fashioned redbaiting (https://www.facebook.com/UAWNo) since the corrupt union shtick wouldn’t work on recently elected union reformers. Part of the difference in corporate attitude may be due to the fact that, while under German law all large corporate boards must include worker representatives, at Volkswagen worker reps hold a majority of board seats while they are in the minority at Mercedes.
Many pundits seem to think that union representation elections in the U.S. are pretty much like a hard-fought municipal election where, after a period of open debate and partisan campaigning, the populace makes a considered decision at the polls unimpeded by threats or fear of retaliation. In reality, they’re much more like a UN-supervised election in a one-party authoritarian regime. On the day of the election, everything is above board. The anti-union placards come down. Both parties have observers at all polling stations and have the right to challenge anyone who they believe isn’t authorized to vote. The Labor Board counts the ballots in front of witnesses and immediately announces the tally. It’s a veritable laboratory of democracy.
What you don’t see is the reign of terror that took place in the weeks preceding the election. The “one-on-ones” with the foreman, the mandatory anti-union meetings where no questions are allowed, the threats, the innuendos, the singling out of union supporters for discipline and unpleasant work assignments. Nick Saban gets to roam the plant backslapping the workers. Union organizers are arrested if they put one foot over the property line. It’s like a municipal election where the opposition is not allowed to campaign inside the city limits. Under these conditions, workers must wage an extraordinary fight both inside and outside the workplace that combines the discretion and discipline of the French resistance with the heroism and solidarity of the early civil rights movement. It’s no wonder so many fall prey to magical thinking and the fantasy that, this time, the company really learned its lesson and things will get better.
For decades, the U.S. labor movement has circled the wagons, trying to protect its past gains against relentless assaults from capital. The UAW was one of the first unions that was forced into this posture beginning with the 1979 Chrysler bankruptcy where the Carter administration compelled the union to accept concessions as a condition for bailing out Chrysler. Of course, the rest of the auto industry wanted in on the game and the race to the bottom began. Since 1979, the percentage of vehicles manufactured in the U.S. by UAW members dropped from upwards of 85% to 51%. Instead of pulling all workers up to their standards, the union was reduced to doing its best to slow the race to the bottom. The union was drawn into “partnership” programs with the companies that helped to create an internal culture of corruption and defeatism. Until the Volkswagen Chattanooga victory in April, the UAW had never won a contested union election in any plant not owned or co-owned by the Big Three. As the labor visionary Tony Mazzocchi once observed, “Workers don’t need a union to negotiate the terms of surrender.”
Last year, new leadership was elected in the UAW pledging to reverse the collaboration with management and timid vision that had hollowed out the union. Immediately after their inauguration they had to commence negotiations with the Big Three. Taking advantage of the post-pandemic labor shortage, they launched an aggressive member mobilization campaign that caught the companies flat-footed and negotiated a stunning contract that reversed decades of concessions. Rather than retreating into their fortress, they immediately pivoted to issue a bold call–backed by substantial union resources–to organize the nearly 50% of auto production that is non-union and won a breakthrough victory at Chattanooga. The Mercedes defeat is certainly a disappointment–a wakeup call that most of the non-union automakers will fight long and hard to hold on to their respective “Alabama discounts.”
What the UAW does next will be decisive for the future of the union and the entire labor movement. Will they continue to try to advance, or will they once again circle the wagons? Reflecting on the Mercedes defeat, I found myself thinking about General Grant’s 1864 Virginia campaigns and pulled out my copy of McPherson’s Battle Cry of Freedom to refresh my memory. After the bloody and indecisive battle at the Wilderness, McPherson wrote, “previous Union generals had withdrawn behind the nearest river…But instead of heading north, they turned south…‘Our spirits rose,’ recalled one veteran, ‘we marched free. The men began to sing.’